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                   Abstract 
With the aim of contributing to the use of stress testing techniques, by now a commonly-used 
practice adopted by the financial community to understand the determinants of financial 
instability, and to measure the size of financial risk,  this work represents an application of macro 
stress testing to the Italian banking system. The paper tries to provide an answer to two 
interrelated questions. Whether, and the extent to which, procyclicality is a prominent feature of 
banks’ soundness and whether exogenous, or policy induced, tightening of monetary conditions 
(sharp and sustained increases in the interest rate and/or appreciation of the exchange rate) 
significantly increases banks’ fragility. The task is accomplished by the estimation of three 
alternative VAR models each using different indicators of banks’ soundness:  the ratio of non 
performing loans (flow and stock data) and interest margins to outstanding loans.  
Two main conclusions emerge. First: the behaviour of either non performing loans or interest 
margins is only weakly procyclical: i.e. that the solidity of Italian banks could be seriously 
undermined only in case of falls in output far more severe than in any previous recession since 
the end of the World War II. The preoccupation expressed by the literature about the dangers of 
financial procyclicality seems, therefore, grossly exaggerated in the case of Italy. Second: in a 
hypothetical scenario where monetary conditions are drastically tightened our banks’ soundness 
indicators exhibit little variations. In this case too the importance attached by the literature to 
exchange rate swings, or monetary tightening more generally, for the setting off of financial 
crises is vastly overstated. 
 
 
JEL: E32, E44, G21 
 
Keywords: banking crises, financial crises, procyclicality, profitability, stress testing, VAR. 
 








   2
 
 
Stress testing of the stability of the Italian banking system: a VAR approach * 
 
1. Introduction   
As a result of the much increased incidence and intensity of financial crises that have occurred in 
the 1990s, the need to better understand the primary determinants of financial instability, and to 
measure the size of financial risk, has become a prominent preoccupation of public policy in 
virtually all jurisdictions. Visible manifestations of such a trend are the upgrade of the charters 
and organisation of regulatory institutions, the creation of new bodies to co-ordinate their action 
at the national level, the development of standardised practices of surveillance of financial 
systems by the international financial institutions and, on the analytical front, the development of 
new sophisticated tools for risk measurement and management. Toward this end, stress testing 
has emerged as a commonly-used practice adopted by individual financial institutions, 
regulators, central banks and international financial institutions. 
This work represents an application of macro stress testing to the Italian banking system to 
explore the sensitivity of Italian banks to selected macro shocks. More precisely the paper 
addresses two related issues raised by a large body of literature. The first one consist in 
ascertaining whether, and the extent to which, procyclicality is a prominent feature of banks’ 
soundness. The second issue addressed here consists in exploring the measure in which 
exogenous, or policy induced, tightening of monetary conditions (sharp and sustained increases 
in the interest rate and/or appreciation of the exchange rate) significantly increases banks’ 
soundness directly, or indirectly, through the deterioration of macroeconomic conditions. Banks’ 
soundness is measured, in this study, by three alternative indicators: the ratios of  the flow or the 
stock of non performing loans and the interest margins to outstanding loans.  
The vector autoregression (VAR) approach already employed by Marcucci and Quagliariello 
(2005) in the case of the Italian banks and Hoggarth et al (2005) in the case of the banking 
system of the United Kingdom has been followed.  The test is conducted by performing, as in    
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 these  works,  sensitivity analysis, i.e., by estimating the impulse-response functions of the 
endogenous variables to unitary shocks. In addition this work tries to improve over existing 
studies in two, ways. First it quantifies the extent to which the selected macroeconomic and 
financial shocks have shaped, in the past fifteen years, the profile of various indicators of banks’ 
soundness and banks’ profitability (i.e. by estimating the historical decomposition of the 
endogenous variables of the model). Second the VAR is employed to simulate hypothetical 
scenarios, to estimate, out-of-sample, the extent to which the Italian banking system is resilient 
to drastic tightening in the monetary conditions that theory and experience include among the 
primary determinants of financial instability. 
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 explains the motivation of the study and 
presents a brief summary of the main theories explaining financial crises and a brief description 
of the principal financial crises that have occurred over the past twenty years. Section  3 
illustrates the estimates of the VAR, of the impulse response and of the historical decomposition 
of shocks (paragraphs 3.1 and 3.2), with paragraph 3.3 devoted to the illustration of the dynamics 
of the system under the scenarios. The conclusions, contained in Section 4, can be summarised 
as follows. 
The behaviour of either non performing loans or interest margins is only weakly procyclical. The 
estimates suggest that the solidity of Italian banks could be seriously undermined only in case of 
falls in output far more severe than in any previous recession since the end of the World War II. 
The preoccupation expressed by the literature about the dangers of financial procyclicality 
seems, therefore, grossly exaggerated in the case of Italy. 
A second finding is that in a hypothetical scenario where monetary conditions are drastically 
tightened (a simultaneous sustained increase of the short-term interest rate and a sharp 
appreciation of the Euro effective exchange rate) our banks’ soundness indicators exhibit little 
variations. In this case too the importance attached by the literature to exchange rate swings, or 
monetary tightening more generally, for the setting off of financial crises is vastly overstated. 
Finally, sensitivity analysis, provides evidence that ample margins of free-capital tend to 
improve both the quality of banks’ portfolios (or interest margins) and general macroeconomic 
conditions. 
2.  Motivation   
Macro stress testing, as a means to measure and manage financial risks (credit, market and 
liquidity risks) and to identify the potential causes of financial crises, has become an important   4
                                                
addition to the tools of national authorities (central banks, regulators), International Financial 
Institutions (principally the IMF through the introduction of FSAPs) and individual financial 
intermediaries. 
This practice, using a widely agreed definition, consists of a growing number of “techniques 
used to assess the vulnerability of a financial system to exceptional but plausible macroeconomic 
shocks.”
1 From a public policy perspective, its rationale can be traced to both the much increased 
frequency and intensity of financial crises since the early 1990s
2 and to the inherently procyclical 
character of financial risk. Financial risk and the real economy interact, thereby amplifying the 
business cycle. During expansions the measured risk tends to fall, encouraging more risk-taking 
and more rapid growth. In the opposite cyclical phase, measured risk increases in step with 
falling output and profits. In extreme cases financial crises may ensue and deepen the downturn.   
As to the crises, a definitely incomplete, but illustrative, list includes the failure of the Savings 
and Loans Institutions in 1987-89, the debt crisis of LDCs that started with the default and 
moratorium of Mexico in 1982, the banking and exchange rate crises of Nordic countries in 
1992-93, the bursting of speculative bubbles in all main asset markets that, during the 1992-96 
period,  caused the technical insolvency of a large fraction of financial institutions in Japan, the 
E.R.M. crisis (1992-93), the currency and banking crisis of Mexico in 1994, the systemic crisis 
of South East Asia in 1996-97, the Russian default on public debt (1998) and, in the same year, 
the collapse of the Long Term Capital Management (till then a successful hedge fund) and the 
devastating twin crisis of Argentina in 2001
3.  
One important feature of recent crises is that they are not caused by the failure of an individual 
institution. Rather their systemic nature is determined by large shocks to the economy (such as 
interest rate hikes, the sudden collapse of the exchange rate, the bursting of a speculative bubble 
in the asset market or a sudden shift of investors’ confidence in highly-indebted countries when 
policies appear to be inconsistent). 
 
1 Sorge (2004), p. 1, who refers to Blaschke at al. (2001).  
2 Bordo et al (2001) demonstrate that in the industrial countries the frequency of crises during the 1990s is much 
greater that in any previous period since the Gold Standard (it is more than three times the frequency observed 
during those years) except the Great Depression. The increased frequency is even more pronounced for the LDCs. 
As to the type of crises, Bordo et al show that in the industrial countries the increased frequency is exclusively due 
to currency crises (the frequency of banking crises does not change very much), while for the LDCs the increase of 
financial instability is primarily due to twin crises. It does not appear, though, that crises have became longer and 
more costly in terms of lost output.      
3 One should add to these the financial scandals that have erupted in the industrial world (Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, 
SunBeam, Pendant, Waste Management, Global Crossing, Parmalat, Cirio, and Vivendi) caused by both serious 
violations of corporate governance, accounting and transparency rules and by deficiencies of the rules themselves. 
As a result, grave damage to market integrity and investors’ confidence ensued.     5
                                                
Most theoretical models and actual experience in a large number of countries are consistent with 
this view, as discussed in Section 2.1 below.  
A rather long list of models, old and recent, shed light on the causes and the consequences of 
financial instability. Davis (2001), for example, describes a two-digit catalogue of basic theories 
and several categories and sub-categories of financial turbulence. For the purpose of this work, 
however, a more limited number of theories help to capture the main characteristics and 
determinants of recent crises: models of bank panic, theories of speculative attacks to “fixed” 
exchange rate regimes, the practices of monetary control, the role of asset price inflation and the 
theory of asymmetric information. The following brief account of the main features of these 
basic theories is intended to better explain the emphasis that this paper assigns to 
macroeconomic factors in the measurement and explanation of banks’ soundness.    
 
2.1.  Bank runs and bank panic 
Bank runs
4 to individual institutions and bank panic, runs involving a large fraction of the 
banking system, represent the earliest manifestations of financial distress. 
Traditional theories emphasise real shocks, monetary policy shocks and mistakes as the main 
causes of bank runs. In their pioneering work Diamond and Dybvig (1983)
5  deposits are 
randomly withdrawn
6  from banks as a consequence of a random realisation of liquidity needs to 
cope with unforeseen consumption needs. In essence they are the manifestation of a self-
fulfilling set of beliefs.
7  
The limits of the early contributions inspired to the Diamond and Dybvig model gave rise to a 
second strand of literature according to which bank runs occur because agents, who operate in an 
environment of pervasive asymmetries of information, rationally revise their opinion about the 
quality of banks’ assets.
8 In this approach real shocks (Friedman and Schwartz (1963)) and 
policy mistakes are the main precursors of bank runs.  
 
4 “A financial crisis is fuelled by fears that means of payments will be unobtainable at any price and, in a fractional-
reserve banking system, leads to a scramble for high-powered money. It is precipitated by actions of the public that 
suddenly squeeze the reserves of the banking system. In a futile attempt to restore reserves, the banks may call 
loans, refuse to roll over existing loans, or resort to selling assets.” Schwartz (1986), p. 11. 
5 Diamond and Dybvig (1983), p. 410. 
6 See Calomiris and Gorton (1991) for a comprehensive survey. 
7 “If agents think that other agents think there will be many withdrawals, then agents at the end of the sequential-
service line will suffer losses. Thus, all agents, seeking to avoid losses associated with being at the end of the line, 
may suddenly decide to redeem their claims, causing the very event they imagined.” Calomiris and Gorton (1991), p. 
121. 
8 “Bank depositors may receive information leading them to revise their assessment of the risk of banks, but they do 
not know which individual banks are most likely to be affected. Since depositors are unable to distinguish individual   6
                                                                                                                                                            
Real and policy shocks are also stressed in more recent contributions. For example, Hellwig 
(1998) emphasises the risks deriving from interest rate spikes and Allen and Gale (1998) stress 
the role that severe cyclical downturns play in undermining banks’ soundness.  
More modern herding and contagion theories
9 have extended earlier models to explain how a 
bank run to an individual bank can degenerate into a systemic bank panic. This may happen if all 
banks are exposed to the same real shock as in Allen and Gale (2000)) or in Freixas, Parigi and 
Rochet (2000) and Aghion, Bolton and Dewatripont (1999). As in previous contributions, the 
domino effect may be caused by imperfectly informed depositors if they fear not being able to 
withdraw their deposits in time, when they receive negative information about the quality of 
banks’ portfolios.  
Bank runs and bank panic have almost disappeared in the industrial countries, but not so in the 
case of the developing world. For example Argentina experienced bank runs on the occasion of 
the 1994 Mexican crisis and, more recently, a bank panic occurred as a consequence of the 2001 
devastating financial crisis. The Argentinean crisis was at the root of a bank run experienced by 
Uruguay because of the strong banking links between the two countries.  
2.2.  Speculative attack to fixed exchange rate regimes  
Financial distress, involving both the corporate sector and financial institutions, has often been 
the consequence of the collapse of exchange rate regimes. A sharp devaluation caused by sudden 
shifts of investors’ confidence may dramatically increase the debt burden of financial and non-
financial firms and produce severe downturns
10.  
It is no surprise, therefore, that exchange rate collapses have happened in parallel with banking 
crises.
11 The parallelism between the two types of crises is in fact striking and, recently, banking 
panic theories, such as that of Diamond e Dybvig, initially conceived to deal only with closed 
economies, have been extended to open economies as the determinants of exchange rate crises 
may be the same as banking crises. 
 
bank risks, they may withdraw a large volume of deposit from all banks in response to a signal.” Calomiris and 
Gorton (1991), p. 124. 
9 See De Bandt and Hartman (2000) for a comprehensive survey.  
10  The most vivid manifestation of a financial crisis induced by the collapse of the exchange rate is that of the South 
Eastern Asian countries. In these countries high and rising (private) debt levels (financed by capital inflows) and the 
fixed exchange rate regime became progressively incompatible. In 1996, foreign investors’ confidence suddenly 
shifted. The huge capital flows reversal forced a dramatic import compression and a sharp fall in output. The 
massive transfer of resources validated, ex-post, the initial loss of confidence (Krugman (1999)).   
11 “While some have argued that [twin] crises were essentially currency crises, others have pushed the view that the 
crises were fundamentally banking crises, where the fixed exchange-rate regime played no precipitating causal role. 
Still others have suggested that the currency and banking crises were closely intertwined.” Marion (1999), p. 1.   7
                                                
An essential feature of these approaches to financial crises is that the collapse of the parity and 
the banking sector crisis take place endogenously. The initial shock is the consequence of 
investors’ beliefs that the policies run by the target country are not sustainable.     
In the first generation of speculative attacks models, the collapse of the parity is the consequence 
of the inconsistency between the maintenance of a fixed exchange rate and an excessive 
expansion of credit (Krugman (1979)). Credit growth translates into a parallel reduction of 
external reserves and the attack takes place when the level of foreign reserves falls below a 
certain threshold. According to the IMF, the 1994 Mexican crisis is consistent with this 
mechanism.
12.  
The role of policy inconsistency is even more explicit in the second generation of speculative 
attack theories. Attacks may take place if the authorities pursue a fixed exchange rate policy 
together with other objectives (the reduction of unemployment (Obstfeld (1994)), expansionary 
policies to offset a negative shock (Masson (1994)) or credit expansion to support fragile banks 
(Calvo (1998) who refers to Latin American experiences) whose achievement may imply the 
abandonment of the fixed parity. This kind of problem can be formalised in ways similar to those 
arising when policies are time inconsistent, as in Kydland and Prescott (1977)
13. The attack will 
take place when investors conclude that the costs of maintaining a fixed parity far exceed the 
benefits of maintaining it. Several authors have explained the ERM crisis of 1992-93 on the basis 
of such a theoretical framework.
14  
The similarities between exchange rate and banking crises
15, have suggested to some authors, as 
in the case of Dooley (1997) and Chang and Velasco (1998a e 1998b), to combine both the bank 
panic and speculative attack models to explain the 1996-98 South Eastern Asian financial crises.   
In these models, monetary authorities accumulate foreign exchange reserves with the twin 
objective of defending the parity and to rescue banks with high foreign currency debt if they are 
subject to runs.  If the level of foreign short-term indebtedness is high the attack takes place 
 
12 As a consequence of the disproportionate issuance of Tesobonos investor feared the dollar reserves would no 
longer be sufficient to cover the full amount of short term liabilities issued by Mexico. To avoid the shift in the 
investor perception of the sustainability of the external position of Mexico would have been necessary to increase 
interest rates. Instead, it was decided to sterilize outflows of reserves by expanding credit with the consequence that 
the balance of payments was primarily financed through reserve depletion  “In short, the devaluation of the Mexican 
peso and the events that followed during the weeks of the freely floating peso are consistent with all the classic 
elements of a speculative attack in the economics literature…” IMF (1995), p. 79.  
13 Flood and Marion (1998). 
14 Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1995) interpret the Mexican crisis along the same lines. 
15 Marion (1999), pages 6 and 7 observes that both types of crises: 
- represent an attack to a particular price (the exchange rate and the deposit-to-cash ratio);  
- erupt when a finite amount of reserves is about to be depleted; 
- depend on inconsistent policies, normally in situations of pervasive information asymmetries.     8
                                                
when the reserves are less than the maturing debt (Dooley) or when depositors massively 
withdraw deposits because they believe that everybody is doing it (Chang and Velasco who 
borrow from the random withdrawal theory of bank panic). Both approaches rely heavily on the 
existence of information asymmetries. In the Dooley model there is moral hazard on the part of 
banks who expect to be rescued by the authorities and on the part of agents indebted in foreign 
currency who rely on the authorities’ promise that the parity will be defended at all costs. In the 
Chang and Velasco interpretation, the outflows of deposits (away from banks and/or away from 
the country) depends on the imperfect information of depositors when expectations change. 
Financial crises in South East Asia became disruptive as a consequence of pervasive public 
guarantee (explicit or implicit) that the governments would firmly defend a fixed parity or the 
unconditional and excessive recourse to the lending of last resort and to deposit insurance for an 
unjustifiable bailing out of failed firms or banks. The public guarantee weakened the incentives 
for private agents to hedge foreign currency debt and, more generally, to monitor financial risk 
making make countries and institutions vulnerable to shocks. 
These models convincingly explain the origin and the dynamics of the Asian crises and critically 
depend on the existence of high foreign currency denominated external debt. However, they may 
have some relevance also in those circumstances where the debt is domestic and denominated in 
domestic currency but is high and partly held by foreign investors.   
2.3.  Policy instability, lending booms and asset price crashes   
The lack of discipline in the conduct of monetary and fiscal policy as a source of financial 
instability is well documented. Not only unsustainable policies were at the root of many episodes 
of real and financial instability in Latin America during the 1970s and the 1980s, but, in the 
IMF’s view, most crises can be traced to the inordinate use of the main tools of economic 
management in the 1990s as well
16.  
In the developed world this kind of process can well explain the origin and the development of 
the crisis that struck three Nordic countries (Finland, Norway and Sweden) in 1992-93. Financial 
havoc sprung from the deregulation of the financial industry that encouraged a strong surge of 
financial flows toward both the corporate sector and households, that until then had been 
squeezed by the financial repression regime. Credit expansion, in turn, gave rise to a dangerous 
 
16 “…monetary and fiscal policies have spurred lending booms, excessive debt accumulation, and overinvestment in 
real assets, which have driven up equity and real estate prices to unsustainable levels. The eventual tightening of 
policies to contain inflation and promote the adjustment of external position, and the inevitable correction of asset 
prices, has led to a slowdown in economic activity, debt servicing difficulties, declining collateral values and net 
worth, and rising levels of nonperforming loans that threatens a bank’s solvency.” IMF (May 1998) p. 81.    9
                                                
increase of asset prices (particularly in the construction industry) that soon went well beyond the 
level that fundamentals might have justified. Exogenous shocks (such as the 1986 collapse of 
energy prices for Norway, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, one of the most important 
commercial partner of Finland, and the ERM crisis in the case of Sweden) contributed to the 
bursting of the speculative bubbles in the asset market and to the setting in motion of strong 
recessive impulses. As a consequence bankruptcies surged and drastically worsened the quality 
of banks’ assets.  
Credit booms and the formation of asset price bubbles have often taken place in a context of 
price stability, lending support to the hypothesis that policy makers, in the conduct of monetary 
policy, had overestimated the importance of price stability and underestimated the role of credit 
in spurring excessive growth and indebtedness, thereby sowing the seed of subsequent financial 
instability.
17 The long financial crisis endured by Japan, the contagious financial turbulence of 
1996-97 experienced by several South East Asian countries and the bursting of the asset prices in 
the United States in the early 2000s seem to conform with this pattern.   
2.4.  Procyclicality of financial systems 
There are several dimensions to the well researched fact that liberalised economies are 
procyclical. During upturns profitability improves and bankruptcies fall reducing banks’ 
fragility. The opposite normally happens during downturns. In addition several factors tend to 
endogenously amplify cyclical swings of both firms’ and banks’ soundness
18. In addition, 
procyclicality may be the consequence of the working of information asymmetries: moral hazard 
can, in fact, lead to increases in financial transaction for speculative purposes that may inflate 
asset prices to unsustainable levels. Inflated asset prices increase the value of the collateral that is 
normally used to “ameliorate information and incentive problems that would otherwise interfere 
with credit expansion”. Rising asset prices stimulate a new round of asset prices’ increases. 
When, for whatever reason, the value of collateral falls, causing an “unplanned increase of 
leverage”, further borrowing is impeded. If this happens the working of the “balance sheet 
channel”
19 may determine a credit crunch and give rise to major financial difficulties for firms.  
A final source of procyclicality may stem from banks’ capital regulation. First, because bank on 
their part are obliged to respect capital standards and tend to restrict credit even further. Second, 
because the laudable prescription that banks’ capital should be related to the riskiness of banks’ 
 
17 See for example Borio and White (2003). For counter-arguments see Bernanke and Gertler (1999). 
18 Borio and White (2003), p. 14. 
19 Bernanke and Gertler (1999) and Krugman (1999)   10
                                                
assets implies the correctness of current systems for the evaluation of risk. In reality, however, 
the application of several credit risk models may lead to undervaluation of risk during expansion 
and overvaluation during downswings. In Lowe’s words (2002), when several tools of credit risk 
models, such as ratings transition matrices, asset correlations and Loss Given Default data are 
calculated as a function of macroeconomic variables, and there are good reasons to do so, “there 
is potential for larger increases in measured risk in downturns, and declines in booms”.
20 If this 
happen, as a large body of the literature confirms, the business cycle is amplified and financial 
risk heightened.  
3.  A parsimonious VAR model for stress testing 
3.1.  The model  
As described in the previous section, progress in the design of new macroeconomic models 
needed to improve our knowledge of the causes and effects of financial disturbances has been 
fast. But these developments pale in comparison with the extent of advances made by the 
empirical literature on stress testing.
21 This body of writings, however, still shows a great deal of 
heterogeneity. Approaches, in fact, differ as to 
-  the nature of the risk considered (credit, market and liquidity risk) and, more important, 
as to whether the various risks are evaluated in the context of an integrated framework or 
whether the analysis is conducted on a single risk factor;  
-  the choice of the relevant institutions: banks, non-banks, insurance companies or the 
whole, interrelated, financial systems; 
-  the type of scenario (single shock or a combination of shocks as in the case of historical 
or hypothetical scenarios);  
-  the chosen methodology (time series analysis, including VARs, or panel regressions or 
structural macro models).  
In this study the stress testing exercise is performed by modelling with a VAR the interactions 
between the macroeconomic and financial variables and various indicator of banks’ soundness - 
as done by Hoggarth, Sorensen and Zicchino (2005) and by Marcucci and Quagliariello (2005). 
However, the approach followed here differs in one important aspect from that adopted by these 
authors. In their papers, the estimated systems were interpreted as the VAR versions of standard 
 
20 Lowe (2002), p. 17. 
21 A comprehensive and accurate survey is provided by Sorge (2004). See also ECB (2006) for a survey of 
approaches adopted in the EMU area.   11
                                                
reduced-form macroeconomic models. One equation represents the open economy IS curve: the 
output gap dynamics is driven by the real interest rate and the real exchange rate. A second 
equation is a standard open economy supply curve, according to which inflation depends on the 
output gap and the exchange rate. The remaining two represent a modified Taylor rule for open 
economies and the equation of exchange rate determination.  
The approach followed here retains the interpretation of the output gap and inflation equations 
but drops the interest and exchange rate equations and uses these two variables in the VAR as 
exogenous variables.  This choice is motivated by the fact that the ECB’s short-term policy rate 
and the dynamics of the Euro exchange rate cannot be regarded as endogenously determined by 
the macroeconomic variables of only one particular country of EMU such as Italy, as their 
inclusion in the number of endogenous variables would necessarily imply. While the choice of 
considering the interest rate and the exchange rate as exogenous to the economic system does not 
fully reflect the fact that the economic conditions of each country participating in the Union are 
taken into account in the formation of the collective decision regarding the stance of monetary 
policy of the Union, it is felt that the chosen approach better reflects the institutional setup of 
EMU rather than the alternative one. This treatment, in addition, allows the estimation of the 
effect of hypothetical scenarios to simulate the dynamics of the economic system in which the 
exogenous variables assume ad hoc hypothetical extreme but plausible values.  
 Given the prominence of banks in the Italian intermediation system, this paper focuses on some 
of the variables that have been identified as possible proxies for financial distress in this sector.  
The final version of the VAR consists, very much in the spirit of the Marcucci and Quagliariello 
contribution, of five endogenous variables (one indicator of banks’ soundness, the output gap, 
the inflation rate, the spread between the loan and deposit rate, and one measure of the amount of 
free capital held by banks) and three exogenous variables (a linear trend, the short-term policy 
rate of the ECB and the Euro effective exchange rate). To test the robustness of the chosen 
specification the VAR has been estimated in three different version that only differ as far as the 
choice of the indicators of banks’ soundness is concerned. 
In the first version of the VAR model, following Marcucci and Quagliariello (2005), the 
indicator of banks’ soundness is represented by the default rate (more precisely the log of the 
ratio of the flow of non performing loans (NPLs) (sofferenze rettificate) emerged in the last 
twelve month to the stock of performing loans outstanding at the beginning of the period).
22  
 
22 For the definition of sofferenze rettificate see Banca d’Italia, Annual report 2005, Appendix.    12
                                                
In a second version  the default rate is replaced by an alternative measure of distress: the log of 
the ratio of the stock of non performing loans to outstanding loans. The default rate is generally 
regarded as a better measure of potential distress, as the stock of non performing loans has 
decreased markedly in the second half of the 1990s when banks started the implementation of 
intense securitisation programs (see Charts 1 and 2)
23. Nonetheless we believe that the stock of 
non performing loans still retains useful information concerning banks’ soundness. The two 
measure of risk are, in fact, complementary rather than alternative. The first measures the 
emergence of new risk, while the second reflects the cumulative burden of non performing loans 
that in each period still remains in the balance sheet of banks. 
A third version of the VAR model has been estimated to assess how one measure of banks’ 
profitability, the interest margins,
24 behaves in different business cycle conditions and when 
exogenous disturbances hit the economy.  
Concerning the effects of the other variables of the VAR models on the indicators of banks’ 
soundness it is expected that positive output gap ( inflation) shocks decrease (increase) the 
default rate and the NPLs-to-loans ratio to reflect the procyclicality of the system. By contrast 
shocks to the output gap and to inflation are both expected to ameliorate interest margins.  
As far as the spread (the interest rate on loans minus the deposit rate
25) is concerned,  it is felt 
that while measured increases of the spread are supposed to increase banks’ soundness and the 
interest margins, sharp spikes of the same variable are expected to increase banks’ fragility 
because of the detrimental effects that might have on borrowers; in particular the focus is on the 
effects of changes in the spread that some authors
26 have shown to be an important indicator of 
adverse conditions in the loan market. More difficult is to predict the effect that banks capital  
may have on the chosen indicators of bank soundness (profitability) as different theoretical 
models have reached divergent conclusions. A survey of studies dealing with this issue is beyond 
the purpose of this work: interested readers are referred to the comprehensive reviews by Santos 
(2001) and VanHoose (2006) and, for an empirical investigation of the effects of banks’ capital 
on the supply of loans in Italy, to Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2003). It suffices here to mention 
some of the main conclusions as they emerge from the literature. 
Koehn and Santomero (1980) and Kim and Santomero (1988) assume that markets are 
incomplete and that banks maximise their financial wealth. If a flat capital requirement is 
 
23  IMF (2006), p. 19.  
24 For the definition of this variable we refer the reader to Casolaro and Gambacorta (2004). 
25 The deposit rate and the loan rate (tasso sugli impieghi) are obtained from the segnalazione decadali (for the 
definition see Methodological note to the table D 15 of the 2005 Annual Report of the Banca d’Italia)  
26 Bonaccorsi di Patti, Gaiotti and Lotti (2004).   13
                                                
introduced, banks’ risk return frontier is restricted: as a compensatory measure, banks have an 
incentive to increase the share of risky assets in their portfolio. A similar result is obtained by 
Rochet (1992) who shows that even a risk weighted capital regulation may be insufficient to 
induce banks to be risk averse. By contrast, Furlong and Keeley (1989) argue that this result does 
not hold if the possibility of banks’ failure is introduced in the model and if it is also assumed 
that banks pay a flat rate of deposit insurance. Gennotte and Pyle (1991) and Dewatripont and 
Tirole (1994) reach the conclusion that increases in the degree of capitalisation make banks more 
risk averse. Finally Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2003) find that “well capitalized banks are more 
risk-averse” and that “can better absorb temporary financial difficulties on the part of their 
borrowers.” In this study alternative indicators of the degree of capitalisation of banks have been 
considered, i.e. the solvency ratio, the log of the banks positive free capital-to-loans ratio or the 
log of the regulatory capital-to-loans ratio, but the best results have been obtained employing 
the free capital ratio. 
Finally, the inclusion of  the short-term policy rate of the ECB
27 and the log of the effective real 
exchange rate
28in the VAR as exogenous variables makes the output gap and inflation equations 
consistent with the open economy IS and supply curves as they are normally specified by the 
literature. More importantly the two exogenous variables are used to estimate, in the hypothetical 
scenarios, the extent to which the indicators of financial distress worsen when, as in many crises, 
they dramatically move to reflect sudden shifts in market confidence or exogenous shocks to the 
economy, such as a sudden dollar crash, which is explicitly considered in this paper.
29  
Chart 1 shows some properties of the data that are consistent with these observations. First there 
is a prima facie evidence that the default rate is inversely correlated with the output gap, 
consistent with the view that banks’ soundness is procyclical. The negative correlation is most 
visible during the 1992-93 recession (but not in the 1996-97 downturn) and in the course of the 
1999-2002 upswing. This behaviour seems to suggest that the intensity of the procyclical 
behaviour of bank soundness may significantly differ across cycles. In addition, if one focuses 
on the other measure of distress (the NPLs/loans ratio) there is no evidence of procyclicality. 
Second, both measures of risk show a marked positive correlation with the dynamics of the 
 
27 The rate is calculated as follows: prior to 1999 it is a weighted average of national policy rates; between January 
1999 and June 2000 it is the ECB’s main refinancing rate (fixed rate tenders) and afterwards is the tender rate 
(minimum bid rate). All data are quarter end.    
28 For the calculation of the effective exchange rate see the Note metodologiche in the Appendix of the 2005 Annual 
Report of the Banca d’Italia. In the first VAR model it was used the nominal effective rate while in the other two 
VARs it was used the real effective exchange rate calculated making use of the producer prices. 
29 See, for example, the role that such shocks have played in the South East Asian crisis (Krugman (1999)) and in 
Argentina (Calvo et al (2002)).    14
                                                
spread (particularly in the case of the default rate). By contrast a negative correlation seems to 
exist between the indicator of positive free capital and banks’ distress indicators, especially since 
the second half of the 1990s when the banking system strengthened its capital position to comply 
with the requirements of the 1988 Capital Accord. In the case of the NPLs/Loans ratio this 
negative correlation depends, in part, by the definition of free capital: NPLs are, in fact, 
subtracted from the value of capital (sum of capitale di base and capitale supplementare).
30   
As to the statistical properties of the series, the chart could suggest that some of the variables 
may not be stationary. To test the statistical significance of this hypothesis, unit root tests were 
performed on the level of the variables. ADF tests generally failed to reject the null hypothesis 
that the series have a unit root. Similarly the Phillips-Perron tests confirmed the results of the 
ADF tests except in the case of the default rate. Given the notorious low power of these tests in 
small samples further tests were conducted using the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (1992) 
methodology. This procedure, which tests the null hypothesis that the series are stationary, 
yielded results in stark contrast with those obtained with the ADF and Phillips-Perron tests. In 
the majority of cases, the tests were performed including a constant and a linear trend in the 
regression (Table 1). In the case of inflation, the NPLs-to-loans ratio and the free capital-to-loan 
ratio the regressions included only the constant. The KPSS test failed to reject the null of 
stationarity in all cases, albeit at different levels of statistical significance. One should bear in 
mind that the results of these tests are to some extent altered by the presence of some extreme 
values taken by several variables (the exchange rate, the default rate, the spread) on the occasion 
of the 1992-93 ERM crisis.  
Given the lack of convincing evidence that the series are not stationary, it was decided to 
estimate the VAR on the level of all variables, despite the fact that the probability that some of 
the series are, in fact, stationary is low.
31    
3.2.  Estimation results 
Three VARs were estimated each considering a different indicator of banking soundness (see 
Tables 2-4). The first two VAR models included, along with the macroeconomic (output gap and 
inflation) and financial variables (the spread and the free capital-to-loans ratio), two alternative 
indicators of banking soundness: the default rate and the NPLs-to-Loans ratio. In the third model 
the relevant variable is represented by the interest margins-to-total intermediated funds ratio. In 
 
30 For the definition of free capital see Banca d’Italia (2005) Appendix: Note metodologiche, pp.279-282. 
31 In the case of the ECB rate and the exchange rate the tests suggest absence of unit roots only after having 
significantly increased the bandwidth relative to the default value.   15
                                                
all three models a linear trend, the short term ECB rate and the effective exchange rate are added 
as exogenous explanatory variables. 
3.2.1.  The default rate Model 
The five endogenous variables of the first model were included in the model in the following 
order: the log of the default rate (DEF), the output gap (GAP), defined as the difference between 
the log of real GDP and its Hodrick-Prescott trend, the year-on-year inflation rate (INF), the 
SPREAD and the log of the positive free capital-to-loans ratio (FREE CAP). This order was 
chosen as done by Marcucci and Quagliariello (2005) and Hoggarth et al (2005) “according to 
the likely speed of reaction to any particular shock”.
32 This ordering of the variables implies the 
hypothesis that the indicator of banks’ soundness reacts with a lag to macroeconomic and 
financial shocks, while the spread and the free capital are affected by contemporaneous shock in 
the output gap, inflation and the indicator of banks’ soundness. The VAR was also estimated 
using a different ordering of the variables, but no significant change in the results was detected. 
A linear trend and the lagged values of the two exogenous indicators of monetary conditions 
were added to the model: the ECB’s policy rate (S) was lagged four periods and the nominal 
effective exchange rate (ER) was lagged one period.
33 In this model, the nominal effective 
exchange rate yielded results more consistent with the a priori expectation that a sudden 
appreciation of the exchange rate worsen the indicators of banks’ soundness and the output gap, 
while dampening inflation, because of the recessionary effects it induces in the economy. The 
lag length has been set to two on the basis of the usual Akaike and Schwartz information criteria, 
although according to the same criteria, one lag could also be used as the two statistics yielded 
conflicting indications. 
The impulse response
34 of the estimated VAR (Chart 3) shows that the default rate falls together 
with real activity and that there are significant interactions between the health of the banking 
industry, the state of the credit market and macroeconomic conditions. 
As to procyclicality, Chart 3 provides some evidence that the response of the default rate to a 
positive shock in the output gap is weakly negative: the response, however is not statistically 
significant. It becomes statistically significant, though, when the sample period is truncated to 
2002.4 as done to simulate the hypothetical scenario discussed in paragraph 3.3. In order to 
 
32 Hoggarth, Sorensen and Zicchino (2005), p. 10. 
33 Similar results were obtained using the real effective exchange rate computed employing the unit labor costs or 
the producer prices. 
34 In the charts the impulse response functions are plotted together with their confidence band obtained adding and 
subtracting to the impulse functions two standard errors.   16
                                                
assess the potential importance of asset prices fluctuations as determinants of the procyclicality 
of banks’ soundness, various indicators of asset prices (general indices of share prices or banks’ 
share prices and/or housing prices) were included in the VAR, but no sensible results were 
obtained. The existence of a limited cyclical response of the default rate to changes in the output 
gap is confirmed by the variance decomposition (Table  5). The variance of the default rate 
explained by the output gap rises after the shock and reaches the value of about 8% in the fourth 
quarter, a value that gently falls to 6.5% at longer horizons. By contrast, the default rate is not 
much influenced by the inflation rate as the impulse response functions indicate. This result, that 
differs, for example, from that obtained with a slightly different specification, by Marcucci and 
Quagliariello or by Hoggarth et al, may well depend on the chosen specification of the model or 
the sample period. Parameter instability is an unfortunately well known problem on stress testing 
models
35. For example if the lag length (here equal to two) is reduced to one as in Martucci and 
Quagliariello, the inflationary shocks produces a statistically significant negative effect on the 
default ratio at the price, however of reducing the explanatory power of other variables. In 
addition the estimated inflation equation yields the puzzling result that the sum of the 
coefficients of the output gap is negative (both coefficients are not significantly different from 
zero). This depends, however, from the fact that in the VAR the inflation equation differs from 
the standard theoretical specification of supply equation for open economies. When an inflation 
equation is specified as a typical supply equation, for example, as in the Appendix of the paper 
by Hoggarth et al (i.e. without including the short-term policy rate of the ECB, the spread and 
the free capital ratio), the estimated coefficients (not reported here) have all the expected signs 
and are strongly significant).       
Chart 3 also shows that the responses of the default rate to shocks in the indicators of credit 
market conditions and of banks’ capital have the expected signs and are statistically significant. 
An increase in the spread persistently increases the default rate: this effect lasts for more than 
one year (this is the span of time during which the response stays within the two standard errors 
band) but it is not very strong; consistently, the variance of the default rate explained by this 
shock is equal to 4% after one year and hovers around the same level thereafter. Significantly 
stronger are the effects of a positive shock in the level of the free capital.
36 The response is 
 
35 In the Italian case parameter instability may also depend on the existence of outliers as in the case of the extreme 
values take by some variables (in particular the exchange rate) on the occasion of the ERM crisis.   
36 The model was also estimated using the solvency ratio instead of the free capital-to-loans ratio. The statistical 
significance of the solvency ratio, however, was never different from zero. The same also happened in the other two 
models as well. The explanation may consist in the fact that compliance with the Capital Accord rules was achieved 
irrespective of the cyclical conditions and of the NPLs’ levels.   17
negative, significant and persistent: after the shock, the impulse response peaks quickly and 
remains negative for more than two years. The quantitative importance and its persistence is 
confirmed by the variance decomposition statistics which show, for this variable, values of 18% 
after one year and 23% after two years. This evidence is consistent with both the theoretical 
conclusions of Furlong and Keeley (1989), Gennotte and Pyle (1991) and Dewatrinpont and 
Tirole (1994) and the empirical evidence provided by Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2003), in the 
case of Italy, according to which increases in the levels of capitalisation improve the quality of 
the banks’ portfolios. 
 The impulse response functions signal the existence of important feedbacks among the banks’ 
soundness, financial variables and the real economy. 
First, a shock in the default rate tends to dampen inflationary pressures (the negative effect on 
the output gap is non significant though). Second, a positive spread shock has the same effects 
on real activity and inflation (the effect on inflation is however short-term and modest). Third, 
shocks in the level of banks’ capitalisation raise the output gap and, correspondingly, inflation: 
these effects are statistically significant and persistent. 
In order to assess the extent to which the various shocks have contributed to shape the dynamics 
of the variables of the system during the period under review, it has been computed the historical 
decomposition of the series (Chart 3) showing the cumulative effects that each shock, taken in 
isolation, has produced on each variable of the VAR during the sample period. As it is 
commonly done, to magnify these effects, the Actual profile of each series in the Chart s equal to 
the difference between the historical profile of that series, and the estimated baseline dynamics. 
The same applies to the series called Contribution that represents the cumulative effect produced 
by individual structural shock to the Actual value of variable on that row of graphs. For example, 
the five graphs on the first row depict how the Actual profile of the default rate has been shaped 
by cumulative Contribution of its own shock (first graph on the first row of graphs), by the 
output gap (second graph on the first row of graphs), by inflation (third graph on the first row of 
graphs) and so on. The sum of the five Contributions adds up to the Actual. 
Two important conclusions can be drawn from the examination of the historical decomposition 
of the default rate. First, the default rate of the Italian banking system is only weakly procyclical. 
Second, the sensitivity of the default rate to cyclical fluctuations of the real output vary 
significantly from one cycle to another. In fact, Chart 3 shows that the output gap had a minimal 
influence on the default rate during the 1992-93 recession (the most serious one in our sample), 
while procyclicality is more apparent, but still quantitatively rather limited, during the 1996-97   18
                                                
downturn and in the 1998-2005 cycle. During the latter period stronger growth contributed to the 
decline of the default rate prior to 2001, but the improvement is reversed during the opposite 
cyclical phase that occurred after that year. To explore the importance of other variables that 
may increase procyclicality the three models were estimated to include various stock exchange 
indices, but no statistically significant effects were detected. 
 It also appears from the Chart that both the spread and the free capital-to-loans ratio contributed 
to the dynamics of the default rate more than the output gap. These effects are more apparent 
since the mid-1990s. Changes in the spread tend to produce movements of the default rate in the 
same direction, consistent with the view that the spread is a good indicator of the credit market 
conditions, while positive shocks in the capitalisation of banks dampen the flow of new bad 
loans. 
Overall these results tend to downplay the importance attached by several authors
37 to 
procyclicality as a powerful factor for the setting-off of financial crises. In the case of Italy, it 
seems that banks’ soundness could be seriously undermined only in cases of extremely adverse 
cyclical conditions: for this to happen the fall in output would probably need to be distinctly 
more severe than in any downturn experienced since the end of World War II.   
Concerning the other variables, a few observations are in order. First there are appreciable 
feedbacks between the real economy and banking and financial variables. Shocks in both the 
spread and the degree of capitalisation contribute to output and inflation dynamics, especially 
toward the end of the sample period. The continuous fall in the spread since 1995 reinforced the 
recovery that followed the 1996-97 recession but its positive influence almost ceased after 2001 
when the marked fall of the spread came to a virtual halt. In a similar way, spread shocks gave a 
procyclical contribution to the dynamics of inflation. The parallelism of the Contribution of the 
spread and of the indicator of the banks’ free capital to the Actual values of inflation is 
particularly pronounced throughout the entire period under review. 
3.2.2.  The NPLs-to-Loans ratio Model 
In a second exercise, the log of the ratio of the stock of the NPLs to the stock of outstanding 
loans at the beginning of the period replaces the default rate, i.e. the ratio of the flow of new bad 
loans to loans, as the indicator of banking soundness. The profile of this new indicator shows a 
continuous rise from 1992 to around 1996 followed by an uninterrupted fall till 2001. After that 
date the NPLs/Loans ratio stabilises (Chart 2). 
 
37 See for example Borio and White (2003).   19
                                                
As already said, it may argued that the marked fall of NPLs in the second half of the 1990s is in 
large part to be attributed to the intense process of securitisation through which the Italian banks 
have mobilised a significant share of problematic loans. It is therefore argued that, because of 
this, the stock of NPLs is not a reliable indicator of the degree of banking fragility. We take a 
different position as the stock of NPLs represents the real bad loan burden still remaining in the 
balance sheets of the banks after the offloading of the securitised doubtful loans. The 
NPLs/Loans ratio, therefore, continues to have an important information content concerning 
banks’ soundness. For example the IMF (2006, p.19) states in its FSAP examination that 
“Despite their rapid development, securitization has not until recently led to substantial 
reduction in risk exposure in banks’ balance sheet.” Furthermore securitisation is a rather 
common practice in most banking systems of developed economies, which have pursued the 
mobilisation of their loans with, perhaps, greater intensity than in Italy. This, however, has not 
prevented other authors from using measures of banking distress, such as the write-off ratio in 
the case of Hoggarth et al, that are influenced by the securitisation processes in their stress 
testing exercises.     
The estimated VAR is similar to the one just described, except that the nominal effective 
exchange rate has been replaced by the real effective rate
38 computed using producer prices. In 
addition, the endogenous variables appear in the VAR with the same ordering as in the default 
rate model (NPLs/Loans, GAP, INF, SPREAD and FREE CAP): as in the previous model, 
different alternative permutations of the ordering of the endogenous variables were performed 
but no appreciable differences in the results were detected.  
The impulse response functions obtained bear marked similarities with those obtained in the 
previous exercise (Chart 4).  
A positive output gap shock decreases the NPLs/Loans ratio, although the effect is significant in 
the short term but not at longer horizons. A confirmation of the weak procyclicality detected by 
the default model comes from the examination of the variance decomposition of the NPLs/Loans 
ratio (Table 6): the percentage of the NPLs/Loans ratio explained by the output gap is never 
greater than 1.5%. The NPLs/Loans ratio, in addition, doesn’t appear to be influenced in any 
appreciable way by inflation either: the impulse response is never significant and the variance 
 
38 While the nominal effective exchange rate can “safely” be regarded as exogenous in the model, the same is not 
strictly true for the real effective exchange rate. However, given the strong correlation between the two measures of 
exchange rate in the recent past, and the fact that changes in the Italian consumer price inflation  has only almost no 
correlation with the changes in the relative producer prices underlying the calculation of the real exchange rate, it 
has been felt that the assumption of treating the real exchange rate as an exogenous variable for the purposes of this 
exercise does not implies any serious distortion of the estimates.   20
explained by inflation is negligible at all horizons.  The same conclusion applies to the effects of 
both the spread and the level of free capital. As matter of fact, the dynamics of the NPLs/Loans 
ratio is dominated by its own shocks.  
The VAR, in addition, confirms the existence of significant feedbacks between banking 
conditions and the real economy.  
A disturbance in the NPLs reduces both output and inflation with the impact on output being 
large and persistent. Around 9% of the output gap variance is, in fact, explained by a shock in 
NPLs after four quarters; this percentage rises to 13% after ten quarters. In the case of inflation, 
less than 4% of the variance is explained by this shock within one year, although the impact 
becomes progressively important at longer horizons (25% after two years). 
In addition, there is some evidence that both the spread and the free capital/loans ratio have 
macroeconomic relevance. Positive disturbances in the spread reduce both the output gap and 
inflation while the opposite happens following positive shocks in the free capital/loans ratio. 
These effects are statistically significant, but not very large. 
The Historical Decomposition (Chart  4) confirms these findings. The dynamics of the 
NPLs/Loans ratio is mostly explained by its own shocks: the procyclicality is rather modest and 
so are the cumulative effects of both spreads’ shocks and of the disturbances in the free capital. 
A rather puzzling result is the muted impact of the spike in the spread that took place before the 
1992-93 crisis.  It appears instead that the effects of the dynamics of both the spread and free 
capital are more pronounced in the last cycle. In particular the Chart shows that the deceleration 
of the free capital-to-loans ratio after the continuous rise started in 1995 had the effect of halting 
the slide of the NPLs after 2001.             
3.2.3.  The Interest Margins Mode. 
The estimation result of this model conforms to several priors one can formulate about the 
reaction of banks’ interest margins to real economy and financial shocks. As expected, margins 
respond favourably to positive disturbances in real output inflation and the spread. By contrast, 
shocks in the free capital are not significant. As in the other model, there are significant feedback 
effects between banks’ profitability and the real economy: positive disturbances in the margins 
increase real output and, because of the effects on the output gap, inflation. Furthermore, a 
worsening of supply conditions in the loan market, signalled by positive shocks in the spread, 
negatively affect output while producing no significant effect on inflation.    21
The Historical Decomposition has strong similarities with those emerging from the other two 
models. In the period under review there is little evidence that output shocks have provoked 
pronounced changes in the same direction of interest margins, except in the final part of the 
sample period. A similar observation can also be made in the case of inflation.  
Finally interest margins own shocks play the predominant role in shaping the variability of this 
indicator of banks profitability.   
3.3.  Hypothetical scenarios  
The estimated VARs were used to simulate the response of the respective indicators of banks’ 
soundness to the combined effects of the main macroeconomic shocks, i.e. interest and exchange 
rate shocks, that in many countries have played a fundamental causal role in starting financial 
crises or acted as catalytic factors in the aggravation and prolongation of financial distress. Two 
main hypothetical scenarios were designed to simulate the effects of a sudden and quantitatively 
unusual tightening of the overall monetary conditions, i.e. a sudden and persistent increase in the 
interest rate, accompanied by an equally sudden and persistent appreciation of the effective 
exchange rate of the Euro. More precisely, it was assumed that at the beginning of the simulation 
period (first quarter of 2003) the ECB’s short-term policy rate would make a two percentage 
points jump, thus almost doubling relative to historical values, and would remain two percentage 
points  higher than actual values throughout the end of the simulation period (fourth quarter of 
2005 – see Chart 6). Such an increase represents a limiting case of monetary restriction as it 
assumes a dramatic departure from the normal interest smoothing policy of central banks, i.e. the 
practice of increasing the rate by a succession of small steps, more or less evenly distributed 
during a time horizon of one or two years. The chosen approach would, however, provide a 
better assessment of the extent to which extreme monetary restrictions (as a matter of fact, not 
unknown in the Italian monetary history) could worsen the banking soundness indicators. In 
addition, in the same scenario it was envisaged that an equally abrupt and permanent 10% 
appreciation of the Euro nominal effective exchange rate would take place starting in the first 
quarter of 2003. The opposite scenarios (i.e. a two percentage points decrease in the interest rate 
and a 10% devaluation of the exchange rate) were also simulated. 
In the scenarios, the 10% appreciation of the Euro would bring the real effective exchange rate 
(calculated using the producer prices) approximately to the level which prevailed around 1992-3 
(Chart  6). The 10% devaluation, in turn, would result in a level comparable with that 
experienced in 1995, i.e. at the beginning of the strong appreciation of the dollar that took place   22
between mid-1995 and 2002. Exchange rate changes of this size are not unprecedented, on a 
year-on-year basis.  For example, the effective real exchange rate of the euro (measured using 
relative unit labour cost or relative producer prices) appreciated by 9% in 1986, relative to one 
year earlier, and again in 1996, relative to 1995. Similarly a 16% devaluation, always on a year-
on- year basis, occurred in the first half of 1993. Approximately during the same period the 
changes in the short term policy rate were of about three percentage points always on a year-on-
year basis. As shown in Chart 6, these changes occurred during the course of approximately one 
year and were not instantaneous as in our hypothetical scenarios. 
 In designing the scenarios, it was not assumed that the hypothesized interest rate changes would 
cause the parallel 10% changes of the exchange rate. It would be exceedingly unrealistic to 
interpret the 10% appreciation (depreciation) as the consequence of the two percentage points 
increase (decrease) in the interest rate. Empirical studies, in fact, do not support the hypothesis 
that the exchange rate reacts in a predictable way to changes in the interest rates. In a useful and 
comprehensive survey, for example, MacDonald and Swagel (2000) show that the main 
monetary exchange rate models postulating a direct link between interest rates (nominal or real) 
and the exchange rate have serious limitations in the sense that, empirically, the coefficients of 
the main models fail to be unitary, as postulated by theory, or even positive. Recent estimates of 
the link between interest rates (nominal or real) and the Euro (the bilateral parity with the US 
dollar or the effective rate) confirm the interpretative limits of these mainstream models (Filosa 
(2004).  
Our appreciation scenario can be best understood as a dollar crash scenario of the type recently 
discussed in several pieces of literature. An appreciation scenario of the hypothesised order of 
magnitude could well be the dramatic, but plausible consequence, of a sudden shift of investors’ 
confidence in the dollar due to the continuation of the unsustainable path of the US balance of 
payments. Thorough analysis of the balance of payments on current account and of the 
investment position of the United States (Roubini and Setters (2004), theoretical models 
(Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000)) and simulations of structural macroeconomic models of the world 
economy (Brook et al (2004) and IMF (2005) all support the plausibility of such a dramatic 
event. In particular, the size of Euro appreciation used in our scenario is almost the same as the 
one used by Brook et al (2004) in their study. These authors use the assumption that the nominal 
effective dollar exchange rate could depreciate by 30% relative to the other OECD countries. If 
the dollar exchange rate vis-à-vis “the non-Japan Asia Region” remains unchanged, the effective 
exchange rate of the dollar would depreciate by 22.5%. This would imply an 11% appreciation   23
                                                
of the Euro effective exchange rate
39, an amount practically coincident with the one used here. A 
realistic dollar crash scenario would need to envisage that the appreciation of the Euro would be 
contrasted by the ECB through a defensive strong decrease of the interest rate. Such hypothesis 
(used by Brook et al) will be considered later on.   
There is some a priori uncertainty as to the effects of the exchange rate appreciation on the 
indicators of banking fragility. On the one hand, defaults would tend to increase and profitability 
to worsen due to the recessionary impulses coming from the deterioration of external 
competitiveness. On the other hand the appreciation of the exchange rate, by reducing the burden 
of foreign currency denominated debt, would ameliorate the balance-sheet position of both banks 
and non-financial corporations, thus inducing an improvement in the banking soundness 
indicators. In the case of Italy this effect should be negligible given the low level of foreign 
currency denominated debt.   
Simulations’ results   
In order to test the effects that an unprecedented tightening of monetary conditions might have 
on the Italian banking system, in one central scenario the two percentage points increase in the 
interest rate and the 10% appreciation the effective exchange rate are supposed to take place 
simultaneously (Tight Scenario in Charts 7 to 9) in the first quarter of 2003. The scenario shares 
important features that have characterised some of the episodes of financial instability that have 
occurred in the not so distant past. The symmetric scenario, i.e. the one envisaging a 
simultaneous two percentage points fall of interest rate and the 10% devaluation of the effective 
exchange rate (Easy Scenario), is also presented in the same  Charts to simulate the effects of a 
limiting case of monetary easing. The solutions obtained in each exercise are out-of-sample 
simulations as the VAR models have been re-estimated over the 1990 - 2002 period to avoid the 
use of coefficients estimated on the basis of an historical profile of the interest and exchange rate 
distinctly different from the hypothetical ones. 
The default rate Model 
In the Tight scenario, as expected, both the output gap and inflation fall (according to the way in 
which the output gap has been calculated a reduction of the gap implies a fall of GDP relative to 
potential) relative to the baseline solution (Base in the Charts). Over the three years simulation 
period the lower gap implies a cumulative loss of GDP, relative to baseline, equal to 0.44%. In 
 
39 Brook et al (2004), p. 8.   24
turn, average baseline inflation during the simulation period is equal to 1.77% and 1.54 in the 
restrictive scenario. These estimates are consistent with, for example, the results obtained by 
Brook  et al (2004). The combined effect of the sustained interest rate hike and of the 
appreciation of the effective exchange rate is a reduction of the spread (0.44% on average) and a 
lower level of the free capital-to-loan ratio.  
The direct effect of the restrictive monetary conditions on the default rate and the indirect impact 
due to the changes in the other variables of the system, produce an average increase of the 
default rate from 0.30 in the baseline to 0.33 in the Tight scenario. The Easy scenario, of course, 
yields a reduction of an approximately equal size. Thus, predictably, the simulations confirm that 
banks’ soundness behaves in a procyclical fashion. More importantly, however, the scenarios 
show that the reaction of the system even to extreme shocks, adverse or favourable, is very 
limited. In the simulation of the Tight scenario the deterioration is much lower than, for example, 
that occurred in 1991 or in 1994.  The banking system, in other words, appears to be rather 
resilient and stable, as already stressed by independent observers, including the IMF, on the 
occasion of the collapse of the Euro and during the ample swings of the Euro relative to the 
dollar since the inception of the new European currency. 
Additional simulations were performed to disentangle the effects attributable to each individual 
disturbance. In the first one the interest rate is kept at its historical values while using the 
shocked series for the exchange rate. In the second one the interest rate is shocked while keeping 
the exchange rate equal to the historical data These scenarios, not reported here, show that the 
exchange rate shocks leave the default rate almost unchanged despite the fact that they 
appreciably move output gap and the other variables of the system. By contrast shocks to the 
ECB policy rate move both the default rate and the output gap: increases in the rate push up the 
spread and, simultaneously depress output (reductions of the rate have the opposite effects). Two 
conclusions can be drawn from these results. The first is that procyclicality is not a prominent 
feature of the way the flow of new bad loans reacts to business cycle fluctuations per se, even 
when shocks are far more intense than those experienced in history. It rather appears that the 
default rate may react indirectly to shocks, such as in our case to exchange rate disturbances,  
that move financial variables, such as the spread or the free capital, that directly change the flow 
of new bad loans along with the output gap. The second conclusion is that in a dollar crash 
scenario it would be possible to compensate the recessionary effects due to the deterioration of 
external competitiveness and avoid a worsening of the banks’ soundness by an appropriate 
reduction of the interest rate.     25
                                                
The NPLs-to-Loans ratio Model 
 
The simulations of the same scenario were performed on this model to further check the 
robustness of the results just illustrated. 
As in the previous case the tightening (easing) of overall monetary conditions reduced 
(increased) the output gap and inflation relative to the baseline solution by amounts similar to 
those obtained using the default rate model. More muted, by contrast were the effect produced on 
the NPLs/Loans ratio. In these scenarios this ratio deviated, slightly and temporarily, from the 
baseline to which it converged again after a few quarters. As before, additional simulations were 
performed to estimate the effects of an interest rate shock while keeping the exchange rate at its 
historical values and, then, those of the exchange rate shock alone. The simulations, not reported 
here, yield results that somewhat differ from those of the default rate model. A depreciation of 
the exchange rate worsens the NPLs/Loans ratio despite the contemporaneous improvement in 
the output gap. This is another indication that banks’ soundness is not necessarily procyclical.  A 
reduction of the ECB policy rate, in turn, reduces the NPLs/Loans ratio. In addition it so happens 
that the two percentages points reduction of the rate exactly offsets the impact of the devaluation 
on the NPLs/Loans ratio. The possibility that monetary policy actions could compensate 
exogenous exchange rate shocks rests, of course, on the possibility that interest rate changes and 
exchange rate changes can remain decoupled, at least to some extent and for some time.   
The interest margins Model  
An overall easing of monetary conditions (i.e. a simultaneous reduction of the ECB policy rate 
and a step depreciation) reduces interest margins by a modest amount. At the same time the 
output gap improves (together with an increase in inflation). The easier monetary conditions also 
tend to reduce the spread (in accord with the view that falling spreads signal favourable supply 
conditions in the loan market) and slightly lower the free capital/loans ratio (an indication that 
when the  economic situation improves banks use the available free capital to expand the 
activity).Thus     in these simulations the interest margins appear to be procyclical as found in 
other studies.
40 In our model, the effects of interest and exchange rate shocks on output, inflation 
and the spread are of an order of magnitude close to those obtained by the simulations of 
mainstream structural models. For example, the simulated cumulative discrepancy of real GDP 
relative to baseline is of the order of 0.45%; in turn the average baseline inflation is equal to 
 
40 See, for example, Albertazzi and Gambacorta (2006).    26
2.07%, while it amounts to 1.92% and 2.51% respectively in the Tight and Easy scenarios. Such 
differences give rise to modest deviations of the interest margins profile from the baseline. Thus, 
even in the most favourable conditions, the possibility of interrupting the declining trend of this 
component of the overall banks’ profitability is remote.       
4.  Conclusions 
This paper makes a quantitative assessment of the extent to which business cycle fluctuations 
and severe, but plausible, adverse monetary shocks may impair the soundness and the 
profitability of the Italian banking system. The motivation of this stress testing exercise 
originates from two distinct, but related, observations. First: financial risk is procyclical. Second: 
sudden and dramatic exchange and interest rate changes, by severely increasing the debt service 
burden of borrowers, have played an important role in increasing the frequency and the intensity 
of financial crises worldwide over the past 20 years.  
To quantify the degree of procyclicality of the Italian banking system and its resilience to 
monetary shocks, three distinct VAR models have been estimated. In the first one the measure of 
banks’ soundness is represented by ratio of the flow of new defaults to outstanding (performing) 
loans. In the second VAR the proxy for banks’ distress is given by the ratio the stock of non-
performing loans to outstanding (performing) loans. In the third model the indicator of bank’ 
soundness is represented by the interest margins-to-loans ratio. The models are estimated to 
perform sensitivity analysis (estimating the impulse response functions) as done in other studies 
using the VAR approach (Marcucci and Quagliariello (2005) and Hoggarth et al (2005)). In 
addition this work goes beyond these studies in two respects. First the VAR is used to quantify 
the measure in which actual fluctuation of the chosen indicators of banks’ distress or profitability 
have been shaped by each structural shock, in the historical period under review (estimation of 
the historical decomposition). Second the VAR have been employed to estimate the out-of-
sample effects of sharp and sudden exogenous changes in the effective exchange rate of the Euro 
and of the ECB’s short-term policy rate. The hypothetical scenarios so obtained provide useful 
indications of the extent to which the Italian banking system is resilient to extreme 
macroeconomic shocks. 
Several conclusions can be drawn from the estimates. 
First. Both indicators of banks’ distress and the interest margins are only weakly procyclical. The 
sensitivity analysis shows that the responses of the indicators to output shocks, while having the 
expected signs and being statistically significant, explain only a modest fraction of the historical   27
variability of the bad loans dynamics. The same can be said of the interest margins variable. It 
also emerged from the estimates that asset prices fluctuations do not have any significant impact 
on Italian banks’ soundness indicators. Thus while booms and busts of asset prices had, in 
several countries, strong effects on both the financial system and the economy, this does not 
seems to be the case for Italy.  
Second. There exist statistically significant feedbacks between the degree of banking soundness 
and the real economy. A positive (negative) shock in the bad loans indicators lowers (increases) 
real activity and inflation. 
Third. Shocks to an indicator of the credit supply conditions in the loan market (the spread 
between the loan and the deposit rate) affect in a predictable way the dynamics of banks’ distress 
and profitability indicators. Positive shocks in the spread, which can be regarded as signal of 
tightening conditions in the loan market, aggravate the bad loans burden on the banks’ balance 
sheet because of the likely adverse effects that such shocks have on the financial position of 
borrowers. As expected, such shocks improve the interest margins of banks confirming the trade-
off that may exist between the profitability of banks and borrowers. 
Fourth. The VAR models include among the endogenous variables a measure of free capital 
available to banks to expand their assets in order to test the existence of effects between the 
capital buffer and the measures of impaired loans together with the feedback effects of these 
banking variables and the real economy. We find that, in fact, increases in the degree of 
capitalisation of banks tend to reduce the non-performing loans and, in addition, that there are 
positive feedbacks on the real economy as positive shocks to free capital increases real output. 
Of course, in such a scenario inflation would tend to rise as well.  
Fifth. The simulations of hypothetical scenarios not only confirm that changing business cycle 
conditions produce only modest changes in the indicators of either banks’ soundness and banks’ 
profitability, but highlight the remarkable robustness of the banking system even to dramatic 
monetary shocks. For example the simulation of a dollar crash scenario produces little variations 
in the indicators of banks’ distress. The fact that in this scenario an appreciation of the exchange 
rate reduces the output gap and the rate of inflation, while keeping almost unchanged the 
indicators of default on loans, suggests the conclusion that procyclicality is not a prominent 
feature of the way the flow of new bad loans react to business cycle fluctuations, even when 
shocks are far more intense than those experienced in history. The same applies to the simulation 
of the interest margins model. The effects of interest and exchange rate shocks on output, 
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   1P-Value 
The critical values of the KPSS test are as follows: 
Constant & Trend: 1% 0,216; 5% 0,146: 10% 0,119. 
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                                                                                                                                        Table 2 
 
Vector Autoregression Estimates of the DEFAULT RATE MODEL 
Sample(adjusted): 1990:3 2005:4 
Included observations: 62 after adjusting endpoints 
t-statistics in [ ] 
 
 
  DEFAULT RATE  GAP  INF  SPREAD  FREE CAPITAL 
 
DEF(-1)  -0.254662  0.001260 -0.148525  0.036241 -0.025584 
  [-1.94850]  [ 0.50732]  [-1.11286]  [ 0.16601]  [-0.59990] 
       
)  0.154921  -0.003282 -0.093770 -0.008875 -0.000616 
  [  1.25645] [-1.40089] [-0.74474] [-0.04309] [-0.01532] 
       
GAP(-1)  1.925145 0.895522 15.17182 7.044686 0.458250 
  [ 0.27344]  [ 6.69367]  [ 2.11030]  [ 0.59905]  [ 0.19947] 
       
GAP(-2)  -16.31940 -0.287639 -17.01220 8.648297  0.286626 
  [-2.30827] [-2.14100] [-2.35640] [  0.73234] [  0.12424] 
       
INF(-1)  0.165307 -0.000859  1.274353 0.068049 0.028327 
  [ 1.48741]  [-0.40654]  [ 11.2289]  [ 0.36657]  [ 0.78112] 
       
INF(-2)  -0.065911  0.001877 -0.441887  0.039754 -0.025851 
  [-0.58353]  [ 0.87444]  [-3.83105]  [ 0.21071]  [-0.70137] 
       
SPREAD(-1)  0.005233 0.000859 0.109524 0.786397 -0.017122 
  [ 0.06884]  [ 0.59463]  [ 1.41103]  [ 6.19391]  [-0.69031] 
       
SPREAD(-2)  0.080423  -0.003836 -0.049365 -0.359390 0.004822 
  [  1.01438] [-2.54612] [-0.60974] [-2.71384] [  0.18640] 
       
FREE  CAP(-1)  -1.189224 0.007064  -0.724744 -2.833331 1.018548 
  [-2.62649] [  0.82106] [-1.56748] [-3.74636] [  6.89402] 
       
FREE  CAP(-2)  0.101945 -0.000319  1.485132 0.682330 -0.273771 
  [ 0.21515]  [-0.03546]  [ 3.06933]  [ 0.86212]  [-1.77067] 
       
C  -2.661970 0.190668  8.956208  -9.780919 -1.495670 
  [-0.73025]  [ 2.75255]  [ 2.40602]  [-1.60639]  [-1.25743] 
       
T  0.002686 -0.000319  -0.012972  0.002417 0.002023 
  [ 0.49729]  [-3.10801]  [-2.35212]  [ 0.26791]  [ 1.14810] 
       
ER(-1)  -0.138897 -0.030138 -1.519231 1.963936  0.222135 
  [-0.20102] [-2.29535] [-2.15317] [  1.70167] [  0.98525] 
       
S(-4)  0.093486 -0.001440  -0.039688  0.261757 0.022303 
  [ 1.74286]  [-1.41248]  [-0.72456]  [ 2.92154]  [ 1.27428] 
 
R-squared  0.861476 0.856010 0.984683 0.955427 0.924367 
Adj.  R-squared  0.823959 0.817013 0.980535 0.943355 0.903883 
Sum  sq.  resids  2.015686 0.000728 2.101900 5.623718 0.214618 
S.E.  equation  0.204923 0.003894 0.209260 0.342288 0.066867 
F-statistic  22.96238 21.95051 237.3736 79.14531 45.12646 
Log  likelihood  18.23723 263.9544 16.93888 -13.56981  87.67276 
Akaike  AIC  -0.136685 -8.063046 -0.094803 0.889349  -2.376541 
Schwarz  SC  0.343636 -7.582725  0.385518 1.369669 -1.896220 
Mean  dependent  -0.721291 -0.000431 3.356538  5.906603  -0.892674 
S.D.  dependent  0.488410 0.009103 1.499893 1.438175 0.215681 
 
Determinant  Residual  Covariance   1.16E-11      
Log Likelihood (d.f. adjusted)    340.5834       
Akaike Information Criteria    -8.728496       
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                                                                                                                                                    Table 3 
Vector Autoregression Estimates of NPLs/LOANS MODEL 
Sample(adjusted): 1990:2 2005:4 
Included observations: 63 after adjusting endpoints 
t-statistics in [ ] 
 
 NPLs/LOANS  GAP  INF  SPREAD  FREE  CAPITAL 
 
NPLs/Loans(-1)   0.722978  -0.039854   0.477314   0.973923  -0.465426 
  [ 4.05530]  [-2.45444]  [ 0.53135]  [ 0.67542]  [-1.67811] 
       
NPLs/Loans(-2)   0.167470   0.028577  -1.885088  -2.378332   0.069626 
  [ 0.84560]  [ 1.58427]  [-1.88904]  [-1.48476]  [ 0.22598] 
       
GAP(-1)  -2.289139   0.837774   9.668645  -2.098550  -1.791706 
  [-1.53655]  [ 6.17415]  [ 1.28800]  [-0.17416]  [-0.77306] 
       
GAP(-2)  -0.302340 -0.349577 -13.16243   19.40075   0.471169 
  [-0.22358] [-2.83828] [-1.93174] [  1.77380] [  0.22397] 
       
INF(-1)  -0.023628 -0.001387   1.123537 -0.117636 -0.017607 
  [-0.91586] [-0.59038] [  8.64309] [-0.56376] [-0.43870] 
       
INF(-2)   0.043375   0.003088  -0.342889   0.140852   0.015407 
  [ 1.75720]  [ 1.37352]  [-2.75686]  [ 0.70550]  [ 0.40123] 
       
SPREAD(-1)   0.003416   5.18E-05   0.020474   0.710110  -0.035806 
  [ 0.20763]  [ 0.03460]  [ 0.24697]  [ 5.33631]  [-1.39891] 
       
SPREAD(-2)  -0.010057 -0.003556 -0.061501 -0.330464   0.010405 
  [-0.67202] [-2.60900] [-0.81556] [-2.73006] [  0.44691] 
       
FREE  CAP(-1)    0.020761 -0.003035 -1.053930 -2.742605   0.899662 
  [  0.21782] [-0.34958] [-2.19456] [-3.55773] [  6.06751] 
       
FREE CAP(-2)  -0.117112   0.000307   0.821753  -0.071670  -0.348480 
  [-1.10383]  [ 0.03178]  [ 1.53717]  [-0.08352]  [-2.11131] 
       
C   1.127688   0.188750   9.068253  -6.807306  -0.682732 
  [ 1.57455]  [ 2.89356]  [ 2.51286]  [-1.17515]  [-0.61276] 
       
T  -0.001528 -0.000524 -0.045565 -0.036073 -0.008052 
  [-0.51482] [-1.93965] [-3.04638] [-1.50247] [-1.74373] 
       
REP(-1)  -0.305875 -0.033988 -1.699345   1.373305   0.032409 
  [-2.18072] [-2.66050] [-2.40444] [  1.21053] [  0.14852] 
       
S(-5)  -0.000690 -0.002004 -0.156085   0.072202 -0.029342 
  [-0.05150] [-1.64145] [-2.31064] [  0.66587] [-1.40686] 
 
 R-squared   0.985357   0.868540   0.985348   0.958069   0.934887 
 Adj. R-squared   0.981472   0.833663   0.981461   0.946944   0.917612 
 Sum sq. resids   0.082899   0.000688   2.104721   5.423080   0.200633 
 S.E. equation   0.041132   0.003746   0.207252   0.332679   0.063989 
 F-statistic   253.6401   24.90290   253.4879   86.12148   54.11791 
 Log likelihood   119.5548   270.5039   17.67386  -12.14030   91.71334 
  Akaike  AIC  -3.350946 -8.142981 -0.116630   0.829851 -2.467090 
 Schwarz SC  -2.874694  -7.666729   0.359622   1.306103  -1.990838 
 Mean dependent  -2.556062  -0.000219   3.397082   5.935062  -0.884776 
 S.D. dependent   0.302179   0.009186   1.522155   1.444303   0.222931 
 
 Determinant Residual Covariance     3.85E-13       
 Log Likelihood (d.f. adjusted)     453.4682 
 Akaike Information Criteria    -12.17359       
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                                                                                                                                                                                                     Table 4 
   
Vector Autoregression Estimates of INTEREST MARGINS MODEL 
Sample(adjusted): 1990:2 2005:4 
Included observations: 63 after adjusting endpoints 
t-statistics in [ ] 
 
 INT.MARGINS    GAP  INF  SPREAD  FREE  CAPITAL 
 
INT.MARGINS (-1)  -0.575882  -0.000979   1.138401   0.183936   0.037166 
  [-4.00184]  [-0.09417]  [ 2.01705]  [ 0.19881]  [ 0.20216] 
       
INT.MARGINS (-2)   0.114660  -0.011468   0.474068   0.207978   0.095003 
  [ 0.79210]  [-1.09688]  [ 0.83503]  [ 0.22348]  [ 0.51373] 
       
GAP(-1)   2.312693   0.895804   13.97171   4.516700  -0.160662 
  [ 1.23389]  [ 6.61698]  [ 1.90066]  [ 0.37483]  [-0.06710] 
       
GAP(-2)   1.581148  -0.247680  -15.35182   9.942041   0.996215 
  [ 0.94480]  [-2.04901]  [-2.33895]  [ 0.92405]  [ 0.46596] 
       
INF(-1)   0.001085   0.000155   1.275717   0.060689   0.026437 
  [ 0.03714]  [ 0.07326]  [ 11.1301]  [ 0.32301]  [ 0.70808] 
       
INF(-2)   0.015577   0.000939  -0.483087   0.042500  -0.029044 
  [ 0.55896]  [ 0.46644]  [-4.41987]  [ 0.23721]  [-0.81579] 
       
SPREAD(-1)   0.065890   0.000799   0.066136   0.791439  -0.012498 
   (0.02041)   (0.00147)   (0.08005)   (0.13123)   (0.02608) 
  [ 3.22807]  [ 0.54200]  [ 0.82614]  [ 6.03104]  [-0.47926] 
       
SPREAD(-2)    0.012484 -0.002879 -0.105259 -0.360961   0.001119 
  [  0.52949] [-1.69056] [-1.13830] [-2.38133] [  0.03714] 
       
FREE  CAP(-1)  -0.313145   0.006842 -0.734018 -2.727967   1.071009 
  [-2.73345] [  0.82685] [-1.63368] [-3.70390] [  7.31787] 
       
FREE CAP(-2)   0.260223   0.000132   1.640271   0.849422  -0.213315 
  [ 2.13641]  [ 0.01496]  [ 3.43359]  [ 1.08472]  [-1.37084] 
       
C  -7.694457   0.096693   16.73223  -6.000572  -0.346437 
  [-4.06217]  [ 0.70674]  [ 2.25231]  [-0.49275]  [-0.14316] 
       
T  -0.009093  -0.000352   0.001134   0.000112   0.001695 
  [-4.74107]  [-2.54081]  [ 0.15071]  [ 0.00910]  [ 0.69187] 
       
ER(-1)  -0.001293 -0.024578 -1.352845   1.731398   0.176141 
  [-0.00710] [-1.86969] [-1.89528] [  1.47973] [  0.75756] 
       
S(-4)   0.029305  -0.001138  -0.066828   0.212673   0.005599 
  [ 2.00999]  [-1.08087]  [-1.16869]  [ 2.26888]  [ 0.30060] 
 
 R-squared   0.968167   0.858605   0.984819   0.954690   0.924903 
 Adj. R-squared   0.959721   0.821093   0.980791   0.942669   0.904979 
 Sum sq. resids   0.141778   0.000740   2.180813   5.860029   0.231397 
 S.E. equation   0.053791   0.003885   0.210965   0.345821   0.068720 
 F-statistic   114.6362   22.88831   244.5118   79.41884   46.42196 
 Log likelihood   102.6507   268.2090   16.55514  -14.58125   87.21969 
  Akaike  AIC  -2.814308 -8.070127 -0.081115   0.907341 -2.324435 
 Schwarz SC  -2.338056  -7.593875   0.395137   1.383593  -1.848182 
 Mean dependent  -5.187102  -0.000219   3.397082   5.935062  -0.884776 
 S.D. dependent   0.268020   0.009186   1.522155   1.444303   0.222931 
 
 Determinant Residual Covariance     7.98E-13       
 Log Likelihood (d.f. adjusted)     430.5359       
 Akaike Information Criteria    -11.44558       
 Schwarz Criteria    -9.064324       
 
  
                                               Table 5 
                  
Variance Decomposition of  the DEFAULT RATE (DEF) MODEL: 
 Period  S.E.  DEF  GAP  INF  SPREAD  FREE CAPITAL 
 1   0.209147   100.0000   0.000000   0.000000   0.000000   0.000000 
 2   0.225584   89.91901   0.031127   0.842057   0.894182   8.313623 
 3   0.257413   76.01387   6.664225   0.839588   4.759283   11.72304 
 4   0.271361   68.51610   7.777237   1.243332   4.716297   17.74703 
 5   0.284135   65.94861   7.620730   2.311299   4.447771   19.67159 
 6   0.289842   63.91822   7.328530   2.959878   4.327555   21.46581 
 7   0.296232   62.94248   7.019353   3.379622   4.425627   22.23292 
 8   0.300687   61.56896   6.818795   3.568168   4.551195   23.49288 
 9   0.305274   60.46598   6.648321   3.688733   4.608841   24.58812 
 10   0.308652   59.49191   6.513338   3.764411   4.582260   25.64808 
 Variance Decomposition of GAP: 
 Period  S.E.  DEF  GAP  INF  SPREAD  FREE CAPITAL 
 1   0.004172   0.032304   99.96770   0.000000   0.000000   0.000000 
 2   0.005608   0.234920   99.06347   0.015652   0.344492   0.341471 
 3   0.006174   2.311978   94.39582   0.706015   1.582240   1.003947 
 4   0.006767   4.626851   80.75268   2.742802   7.777572   4.100093 
 5   0.007647   7.907212   63.52424   5.606626   12.27485   10.68707 
 6   0.008531   10.12880   51.04651   7.833527   12.15625   18.83491 
 7   0.009278   12.10886   43.19852   8.933392   10.73075   25.02847 
 8   0.009792   13.31548   38.82649   9.205962   9.710630   28.94144 
 9   0.010116   14.05319   36.37765   9.121886   9.153891   31.29339 
 10   0.010325   14.36262   34.95243   8.955659   8.881025   32.84826 
 Variance Decomposition of INF: 
 Period  S.E.  DEF  GAP  INF  SPREAD  FREE CAPITAL 
 1   0.211736   5.954458   0.754890   93.29065   0.000000   0.000000 
 2   0.325470   11.24887   2.294670   82.42632   1.291811   2.738330 
 3   0.382953   17.12619   5.854749   73.37451   1.128578   2.515970 
 4   0.433768   21.70449   9.399850   61.44694   3.727450   3.721275 
 5   0.519158   21.29667   9.970111   45.43589   10.67468   12.62265 
 6   0.624976   19.76767   8.177686   34.11241   13.43560   24.50664 
 7   0.721786   19.24498   6.303976   28.38592   12.38005   33.68508 
 8   0.795950   19.52411   5.184978   25.51437   10.74647   39.03007 
 9   0.845567   19.97349   4.613548   23.86980   9.662439   41.88073 
 10   0.876517   20.28195   4.293868   22.80013   9.075770   43.54828 
 Variance Decomposition of SPREAD: 
 Period  S.E.  DEF  GAP  INF  SPREAD  FREE CAPITAL 
 1   0.375764   0.488915   3.278755   0.106402   96.12593   0.000000 
 2   0.533079   1.645732   1.927159   2.130838   81.22094   13.07533 
 3   0.642439   3.872485   2.575600   5.036381   58.41195   30.10358 
 4   0.719203   5.911138   5.262063   6.269866   47.04550   35.51144 
 5   0.750319   6.760657   6.796220   6.215761   44.61926   35.60811 
 6   0.755550   6.887226   6.935349   6.142955   44.64744   35.38703 
 7   0.757162   6.864017   6.984654   6.399256   44.51551   35.23656 
 8   0.759795   6.906868   7.234885   6.638566   44.21914   35.00054 
 9   0.761208   6.962395   7.366404   6.711473   44.08672   34.87301 
 10   0.761432   6.986961   7.374648   6.715045   44.06834   34.85501 
 Variance Decomposition of FREE CAPITAL: 
 Period  S.E.  DEF  GAP  INF  SPREAD  FREE CAPITAL 
 1   0.072417   6.361492   0.984099   2.491583   3.309794   86.85303 
 2   0.105293   9.640259   1.367828   6.217463   4.125585   78.64886 
 3   0.122848   12.01901   1.263648   8.832576   3.511293   74.37347 
 4   0.133104   14.35193   1.114650   9.854036   3.077127   71.60226 
 5   0.139631   15.71355   1.040129   9.949613   2.986441   70.31027 
 6   0.144819   16.33772   1.057684   9.724932   3.244599   69.63507 
 7   0.149354   16.47434   1.111488   9.476068   3.551301   69.38680 
 8   0.153121   16.52486   1.119223   9.320077   3.671056   69.36478 
 9   0.155910   16.59870   1.091391   9.252078   3.654630   69.40320 
 10   0.157790   16.69984   1.066277   9.218383   3.610253   69.40525 
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Variance Decomposition of  the NPLS/LOANS MODEL: 
 Period  S.E.  NPLS/LOANS  GAP  INF  SPREAD  FREE CAPITAL 
 1   0.030376   100.0000   0.000000   0.000000   0.000000   0.000000 
 2   0.037119   94.29646   1.462538   2.790463   0.399718   1.050819 
 3   0.045020   94.45823   1.214148   2.935419   0.477348   0.914856 
 4   0.051249   94.92263   0.946639   2.799887   0.470030   0.860810 
 5   0.057821   95.55612   0.817399   2.456509   0.396346   0.773626 
 6   0.064337   96.14083   0.703012   2.122467   0.350435   0.683255 
 7   0.071022   96.62993   0.607118   1.782750   0.380393   0.599810 
 8   0.077798   96.96805   0.530295   1.491641   0.453881   0.556137 
 9   0.084696   97.19253   0.458269   1.258680   0.527632   0.562886 
 10   0.091721   97.33332   0.391566   1.073482   0.593526   0.608110 
 Variance Decomposition of GAP: 
 Period  S.E.  NPLS/LOANS  GAP  INF  SPREAD  FREE CAPITAL 
 1   0.004024   1.647849   98.35215   0.000000   0.000000   0.000000 
 2   0.005471   8.361583   91.16059   0.055473   0.129963   0.292394 
 3   0.005924   9.524436   85.54371   1.784581   2.413689   0.733584 
 4   0.006364   9.423424   74.40638   8.056480   7.383716   0.730003 
 5   0.006838   8.770365   65.20653   14.00780   9.430651   2.584658 
 6   0.007276   8.417863   60.92726   16.13236   9.074933   5.447584 
 7   0.007618   8.595296   60.11274   15.94187   8.343496   7.006593 
 8   0.007832   9.496316   60.10944   15.24187   7.931180   7.221192 
 9   0.007976   11.08653   59.23197   14.72254   7.982958   6.976000 
 10   0.008131   13.17767   57.16388   14.46898   8.307084   6.882384 
 Variance Decomposition of INF: 
 Period  S.E.  NPLS/LOANS  GAP  INF  SPREAD  FREE CAPITAL 
 1   0.221452   2.043323   0.201313   97.75536   0.000000   0.000000 
 2   0.341127   4.478732   1.191615   89.30413   0.205560   4.819964 
 3   0.400939   3.362128   2.192308   84.59322   0.215091   9.637250 
 4   0.433137   3.238386   2.992586   81.83039   0.540456   11.39819 
 5   0.453930   5.195867   3.206781   79.33872   1.627234   10.63140 
 6   0.473591   8.753301   2.946055   75.51518   2.648468   10.13700 
 7   0.496268   12.89976   3.289553   70.14548   3.072395   10.59282 
 8   0.520202   16.90939   4.619999   64.47753   2.989228   11.00385 
 9   0.542382   20.84575   6.101374   59.50074   2.749910   10.80223 
 10   0.562509   24.92658   6.896291   55.32385   2.697055   10.15623 
 Variance Decomposition of SPREAD: 
 Period  S.E.  NPLS/LOANS  GAP  INF  SPREAD  FREE CAPITAL 
 1   0.356509   0.564277   4.194672   5.054139   90.18691   0.000000 
 2   0.500051   3.032408   3.027759   10.13221   70.99842   12.80921 
 3   0.603030   2.432770   6.184995   10.16038   51.25665   29.96521 
 4   0.700549   1.826130   18.39416   8.217601   38.14550   33.41661 
 5   0.757389   1.565376   27.22592   7.140416   32.63499   31.43330 
 6   0.778119   1.484056   30.30063   6.827861   31.44204   29.94542 
 7   0.791936   1.477770   29.85511   7.410639   32.05412   29.20236 
 8   0.812307   1.570323   28.48286   8.647966   32.16249   29.13636 
 9   0.836232   1.768256   28.09566   9.566496   31.12706   29.44253 
 10   0.856801   2.014480   28.89554   9.784593   29.80659   29.49880 
 Variance Decomposition of FREE CAPITAL: 
 Period  S.E.  NPLS/LOANS  GAP  INF  SPREAD  FREE CAPITAL 
 1   0.068908   6.725822   0.624812   0.122383   4.459370   88.06761 
 2   0.095036   11.33987   1.695577   0.749064   7.967082   78.24841 
 3   0.107383   13.36757   4.847199   2.885415   8.668324   70.23150 
 4   0.114400   13.96087   9.651679   4.668933   7.715171   64.00334 
 5   0.118906   14.61830   13.48757   4.912698   7.571267   59.41016 
 6   0.122163   16.12980   14.50624   4.654637   8.241407   56.46792 
 7   0.125886   18.60502   13.72054   4.699855   8.857602   54.11698 
 8   0.130874   21.67482   13.05401   4.929748   8.944971   51.39645 
 9   0.136365   24.98685   13.02061   4.986408   8.569035   48.43710 
 10   0.141381   28.37720   13.12326   4.793948   8.038469   45.66712 
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Variance Decomposition of  the INTEREST MARGINS MODEL: 
Period S.E.  INT.MARG  GAP  INF  SPREAD  FREE  CAPITAL 
1  0.060151 100.0000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
2  0.076333 77.06005 0.092969 0.735183 11.71796 10.39383 
3  0.083731 77.90990 1.462574 0.861473 11.01166 8.754395 
4  0.090014 72.43577 2.946649 0.803627 9.966789 13.84717 
5  0.092339 70.76850 4.741001 0.843326 10.20950 13.43768 
6  0.094222 70.11269 5.034103 1.152524 10.15858 13.54210 
7  0.095400 69.00843 4.924745 1.827363 10.59439 13.64507 
8  0.096058 68.34483 5.008739 2.411959 10.55418 13.68029 
9  0.097216 67.33878 5.096064 2.721096 10.37910 14.46496 
10  0.097615 66.79055 5.204348 2.802642 10.29784 14.90461 
Variance Decomposition of GAP: 
Period S.E.  INT.MARG  GAP  INF  SPREAD  FREE  CAPITAL 
1  0.004127 8.326887 91.67311 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
2  0.005545 10.41161 88.39370 0.478581 0.417107 0.299008 
3  0.006008 9.177059 85.89062 3.189768 0.423928 1.318623 
4  0.006556 8.426238 74.34660 8.396405 3.351961 5.478792 
5  0.007241 7.253204 61.10937 13.00217 6.381301 12.25395 
6  0.008057 7.114930 49.43874 14.90247 6.888554 21.65530 
7  0.008797 7.244767 41.82045 14.87469 6.087717 29.97238 
8  0.009438 7.988859 36.60058 13.92228 5.303424 36.18486 
9  0.009895 8.549707 33.33765 12.99052 4.832039 40.29008 
10  0.010235 9.065127 31.17639 12.24123 4.527251 42.99000 
Variance Decomposition of INF: 
Period S.E.  INT.MARG  GAP  INF  SPREAD  FREE  CAPITAL 
1  0.222734 1.643975 1.337953 97.01807 0.000000 0.000000 
2  0.373513 11.59838 0.792389 84.43275 0.607617 2.568861 
3  0.458387 16.78219 2.210919 77.12660 0.903886 2.976412 
4  0.503174 19.17243 4.379585 72.72607 0.786304 2.935611 
5  0.551494 18.45666 5.629883 65.08211 1.847003 8.984345 
6  0.620727 16.16376 5.157655 54.66050 3.299982 20.71811 
7  0.699126 14.17613 4.127050 45.72841 3.744090 32.22431 
8  0.772473 13.16802 3.394497 39.35740 3.455169 40.62491 
9  0.832663 12.89700 2.959947 35.01086 3.042720 46.08947 
10  0.878844 12.98732 2.662316 32.00424 2.735297 49.61083 
Variance Decomposition of SPREAD: 
Period S.E.  INT.MARG  GAP  INF  SPREAD  FREE  CAPITAL 
1  0.377342 5.748840 6.142701 2.179713 85.92875 0.000000 
2  0.530403 4.055856 4.086721 4.097344 74.50807 13.25201 
3  0.633672 2.844456 5.016572 5.622390 54.60578 31.91081 
4  0.717398 3.080661 9.469932 5.657705 42.79468 38.99702 
5  0.757367 4.044126 11.42356 5.190933 39.30923 40.03215 
6  0.770947 4.893686 11.27462 5.153389 38.70016 39.97815 
7  0.777840 5.154381 11.26590 5.588815 38.40632 39.58458 
8  0.783011 5.145856 11.78587 5.931948 37.99373 39.14259 
9  0.785803 5.109362 12.29279 5.991515 37.72435 38.88198 
10  0.787041 5.097700 12.51912 5.973810 37.64297 38.76640 
Variance Decomposition of FREE CAPITAL: 
Period S.E.  INT.MARG  GAP  INF  SPREAD  FREE  CAPITAL 
1  0.075185 1.760049 0.212996 0.493155 2.860850 94.67295 
2  0.109830 2.696135 0.145733 3.241084 3.428880 90.48817 
3  0.131696 5.160281 0.105517 5.554179 2.804101 86.37592 
4  0.145482 7.048787 0.086638 6.593129 2.297956 83.97349 
5  0.155411 8.637232 0.101478 6.747292 2.035006 82.47899 
6  0.162711 9.415957 0.235845 6.623001 1.856565 81.86863 
7  0.169040 9.812159 0.476050 6.453894 1.752441 81.50546 
8  0.174614 9.912844 0.674486 6.363402 1.711831 81.33744 
9  0.179672 9.968358 0.764182 6.364038 1.690680 81.21274 
10  0.184078 10.00813 0.780932 6.426596 1.664277 81.12007 
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Variables in Levels-Sample 1990.3 2005.4
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Variables in Levels-Sample 1990.3 2005.4
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Variables in Levels-Sample 1992.3 2005.4
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(interest margins and free capital data are normalized)
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